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2Abstract
Classical conditioning theories of addiction suggest that stimuli associated with rewards 
acquire incentive salience, inducing emotional and attentional conditioned responses. It is 
not clear whether those responses occur without contingency awareness (CA), i.e. are based 
on explicit or implicit learning processes. Examining implicit aspects of stimulus-reward 
associations can improve our understanding of addictive behaviours, supporting treatment 
and prevention strategies.  However, the acquisition of conditioned responses without CA 
has yet to be rigorously demonstrated, as the existing literature shows a lack of 
methodological agreement regarding the measurement of implicit and explicit processes. 
The purpose of two experiments presented here was to study the emotional value acquired 
by CS through implicit emotional and attentional processes, trying to overcome critical 
methodological issues.
Experiment 1 (n=48) paired two stimuli categories (houses/buildings) with high (HR) or low 
(LR) probabilities of monetary reward. An Emotional Attentional Blink revealed preferential 
attention for HR over LR regardless of CA; while pleasantness ratings were unaffected, 
probably due to the intrinsic nature of CS.
Experiment 2 (n=60) replicated the effect of conditioning on the Emotional Attentional Blink 
utilising abstract CS (octagons/squares). In addition increased pleasantness for HR over LR 
was found significant overall, and marginally significant for Aware but not for Unaware 
participants. Here CA was rigorously determined using a signal-detection analysis and 
metacognitive-awareness measurements. Bayesian analyses verified the unconscious nature 
of the learning. 
These findings demonstrate that attentional conditioned responses can occur without CA 
and advance our understanding of the mechanisms by which implicit conditioning can occur 
and becomes observable. Furthermore, these results can highlight how addictive behaviours 
might develop.
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31. Introduction: 
Processes related to Classical conditioning have been proven to determine the development 
of addictive behaviours. Stimuli conditioned (CS) with addictive drugs acquire hedonic and 
reinforcing properties associated with the substance [1, 2], ultimately driving and maintaining 
drug-seeking behaviours. As part of this process, drug-related cues generate preferential 
attention and emotional ratings in heavy drinkers of alcohol, cocaine addicts [3] and smokers 
[4, 5]. Most of the conditioned responses occur with subjects’ awareness [6], as substance 
expectancy generated by drug-paired stimuli is responsible for attentional, instrumental and 
hedonic conditioned responses [7].  However, conditioned responses may also occur without 
subjects’ awareness, and could be studied from an implicit point of view.  
The study of implicit processes within addiction has gained increasing relevance, as pointed 
by Wiers and Stacy [8], leading to dual-process theories of addiction. Dual process theories 
of addiction conceptualize addictive behaviours as the combination of automatic appetitive 
appraisals generated by associations [9] in opposition to regulatory executive signals based 
on propositional knowledge [10]. However, the model presented by Wiers and Stacy does not 
specify the nature (implicit and/or explicit) of the associations generating automatic responses, 
obviating the role implicit learning may have in the development of automatic responses 
towards drug related stimuli. Determining the extent to which implicitly generated associations 
can induce conditioned responses without awareness could provide a better understanding of 
addictive behaviours.
Implicit processes in addiction are most commonly studied via attentional bias measurements, 
memory associations or action tendencies [8] using naturalistic stimuli, materials conceptually 
related to a substance. The use of naturalistic stimuli we think is a limitation, as the explicit 
conceptual representation of the substance is necessarily bounded to drug-related stimuli, 
compromising the dissociation between implicit and explicit processes even in automatic 
detection tasks.
Neutral cues paired with alcoholic drinks or tobacco can also generate attentional and 
autonomous reactions through classical conditioning [11, 12]. Furthermore, stimuli associated 
with non-drug rewards can also be conditioned to  generate incentive responses equivalent to 
those elicited by drug-related stimuli [13]. Given that CSs in this case are originally devoid of 
any motivational attributes, conditioning paradigms can provide an opportunity to investigate 
the development of implicit (as well as explicit) processes through learned associations 
between such stimuli and rewards in the laboratory.
Within the Evaluative Conditioning (EC) paradigm, the modification or generation of emotional 
responses towards cues paired with positively or negatively valenced stimuli [14], has led to 
confronting viewpoints about the necessity of learning to be conscious in order to elicit 
measurable responses. A meta-analysis [15] showed that pleasantness can occur without 
Contingency Awareness (CA), that is, without conscious knowledge, i.e. knowledge that the 
neutral CS had been associated with a highly emotional stimulus.  However, opposing views 
are still prevalent [16, 17]. Whether conditioning can occur without CA has generated a 
discussion regarding the methods most appropriate to measure implicit [18], or explicit 
knowledge about contingencies [19].
Furthermore implicit learning in Pavlovian conditioning tasks is most commonly demonstrated 
using direct self-report measurements of liking [20, 21]. This type of assessment is based on 
Likert or Visual Analog scales in which participants evaluate the pleasantness of a stimulus. 
De Houwer [22] however, has advocated for the need to study emotional reactions in the 
context of Implicit learning through indirect measures of automatic behaviour.
4Attentional processes are strongly affected by the emotional salience of stimuli (see [23] for a 
review), and attentional correlates of conditioned stimuli have been employed in Pavlovian 
conditioning procedures. Hogarth et al, has demonstrated attentional orientation to stimuli 
associated with a monetary reward versus non-reward using eye tracking [7], whereas 
Anderson, Laurent, and Yantis [24] showed that stimuli paired with high-reward (HR) versus 
low reward (LR)  probabilities were more distracting on a visual search task. Automatic 
attention allocation towards CS has also been demonstrated using rapid serial visual 
presentation tasks (RSVP). In this kind of task, also known as Attentional Blink [25], a stream 
of pictures is presented and participants have to detect a target embedded within the stream. 
Before the target, a distractor is also presented, affecting the accuracy on detection of the 
target. Emotional Attentional Blink (EAB) tasks [26] employ emotional stimuli as distractors 
during the RSVP. 
Conditioned stimuli have been used during RSVP tasks both as distractors during an aversive 
conditioning task [27], and as targets during a task irrelevant Pavlovian conditioning procedure 
[28], providing evidence towards the ability of CS to capture attention.  However, no measures 
of CA (see below) were included in this task. Thus, it cannot be excluded that the ability of the 
CS to guide attention is based on explicit knowledge about stimulus-outcome contingencies, 
a matter that will be addressed in this paper.
Measurements of CA in Pavlovian Conditioning are often based on post-hoc ratings, i.e. 
asking participants how stimuli and outcomes were related to each other during learning.  
Lovibond and Shanks [19], proposed as the most valid measures of CA to ask participants on 
a trial by trial basis to anticipate the outcome using Likert or Visual Analogue Scales in the 
presence of CS. Several studies have considered such criteria for measures of Expectancy 
Awareness (e.g. [21, 29]) showing that pleasantness ratings for the CS can occur in the 
absence of CA. Others have appealed to retrospective measurements when measuring CA 
[30]. These differences in terms of CA measurement could in turn explain the inconsistencies 
found in experimental literature related to Implicit Conditioning [16].
Prior literature in the field of Implicit learning has primarily focused on artificial grammar-
learning tasks [31, 32] and sequence learning [33], but few studies have used self-reports  in 
conditioning experiments [34, 35]. In these latter studies, however, no implicit conditioned 
responses were found.
Measures of CA and Implicit learning as previously described respond to the criteria set out 
by classical implicit learning theories [32] in which objective measurements (i.e. accuracy on 
a detection task) are combined with subjective evaluations (i.e. ability to report a rule). 
However, a third layer of measurement can be implemented, testing whether participants have 
developed Metacognitive awareness about their knowledge of the set of rules underlying the 
procedure, that is, whether they can explicitly report those rules [36, 37]. 
To our knowledge, there are no studies which have successfully incorporated the criteria set 
out by Dienes and Perner [36] for a distinction of explicit from implicit knowledge using 
Metacognitive measures (e.g. [38, 39]) within a Pavlovian conditioning task. 
The purpose of this paper was to examine if stimuli conditioned to a reward outcome would 
implicitly generate attentional and/or emotional conditioned responses. A task irrelevant 
conditioning task was used to limit the extent to which participants reached CA. An EAB 
studied the ability of CS to overcome the effect of emotional distractors, therefore assessing 
their ability to generate preferential attention. In this kind of task, aversive distractors decrease 
the accuracy on detection of targets compared to neutral distractors. We hypothesize that 
detection of LR stimuli will decrease when distractors are aversive compared to when they are 
neutral, an effect that should be weaker for HR stimuli. This would show HR stimuli develop 
preferential attention as they are able to overcome the effect of negative distractors.  
 A novel approach for conditioning learning was employed in Experiment 2 following methods 
originating from the Implicit Learning literature [40], to classify participants in different groups 
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Unawareness of Contingencies; Partial Awareness, being able to predict the nature of an 
outcome without explicit knowledge about it; and Metacognitive Awareness, in which explicit 
knowledge about the contingencies is developed.
2. EXPERIMENT 1:
2.1 AIMS
The aim of this first experiment was to examine the occurrence of implicitly conditioned 
responses.  Particularly, we assessed whether awareness about contingencies between CS 
and its outcome is necessary to develop preferential attention towards stimuli predicting higher 
chances of reward. Another focus of the experiment was to investigate whether this 
preferential attention occurs together with a development of Pleasantness towards the 
aforementioned stimuli. 
2.2 METHODS
2.2.1 Participants:
Forty Eight University of Sussex students (28 females), mean age 22.7 years, were recruited 
via an online participant database and compensated for their time financially or with course 
credit. Participants gave written consent before beginning the study, with ethical approval 
being granted by the University of Sussex Life Sciences ethics committee. Inclusion criteria 
were that they were in a state of good health, whereas exclusion criteria were that they were 
currently taking prescription medication (excluding the contraceptive pill) or reported having 
been diagnosed with a mental illness.
2.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli:
During the conditioning phase, pictures depicting Buildings or Houses (36 of each category) 
were used as CSs throughout the experiment. Pictures were selected to be neutral with regard 
to pleasantness ratings of a pool of 50 House and 50 Building pictures before the experiment. 
An independent sample (n=16) rated the pleasantness of the pictures via Likert scales (from 
1 to 9). From each category, 14 pictures with the highest deviation in pleasantness ratings 
from the mean were excluded to generate a definitive final list of 72 stimuli as neutral as 
possible. No significant differences in Pleasantness between Houses (5.14, SD=.86) and 
Buildings (5.14, SD=.56), were found p>.538. Pleasantness towards the selected Houses and 
Buildings was measured also by a larger independent sample of participants (n=40) to confirm 
stimuli similarity.  No significant differences were found between Houses (5.01, SD=.89) and 
Buildings (4.83, SD=.97) regarding pleasantness, p>.3.
During the Emotional Attentional Blink stimuli were used as targets among a series of picture 
fillers, composed by 4x5 matrices of Houses and Buildings (see Fig. 2 for an example). 
Distractors, aversive and neutral pictures, were obtained from the IAPS picture data base [41] 
with additional matched aversive pictures from the internet.
Stimuli were presented on a Dell ACPI 64-bit PC, screen refresh rate= 16.6ms. Procedures 
were performed using E-prime 2. Data analysis was performed using SPSS and Matlab. 
During the conditioning phase 10, 20 and 50p coins were used as tangible reinforcers at the 
end of each block. 
2.2.3 Procedure: 
Participants following informed consent completed questionnaires regarding their 
demographics and drug use, the AUQ [42] and AUDIT [43] questionnaires measuring alcohol 
consumption, the BIS-11 impulsivity questionnaire [44], the BIS BAS questionnaire on 
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also took an Interoception Assessment involving Heartbeat measurements [47], not described 
in this paper. Afterwards, they completed Conditioning, Emotional Attentional Blink and 
Pleasantness measurement tasks. 
The experiment lasted approximately 80 minutes.
2.2.4 Conditioning task: 
A task irrelevant Conditioning procedure was used to pair stimuli belonging to one of the 
categories (Houses vs. Buildings) with high (80%) or low (20%) probabilities of obtaining 10p 
[28]. For half of the participants, High Reward probability (HR) stimuli consisted of Houses 
and Low Reward probability (LR) stimuli consisted of Buildings, and vice versa. 
CSs appeared on screen with an overlaid green or yellow square for 2000 ms or until a 
response was recorded (max recorded time 1499 ms). Participants were instructed to press a 
green or yellow key on the keyboard depending on the colour of the square. Participants were 
also informed that from time to time they would obtain money but were kept naïve about the 
nature of stimuli predicting reward or about the contingencies between stimuli and reward. As 
this conditioning procedure was task-irrelevant, the stimulus category (House or Building) was 
the only factor predictive of reward. Feedback was on screen for 1500 ms indicating whether 
the participant had obtained 10p or nothing on that particular trial.
Following correct responses to the yellow or green key participants were asked to indicate on 
a Likert scale from 1 to 9 how likely they were to win 10p whilst the stimulus remained on the 
screen (measurement of expectancy Awareness (EA)). Immediately after the response, they 
received feedback about the outcome of the trial (Fig. 1). Only in 25% of the Conditioning trials 
EA was measured as a means to avoid excessive priming towards contingency elaboration 
[19]; EA evaluation was pseudorandomized to occur every 3, 4 or 5 trials to prevent 
participants from establishing rules regarding its measurement. Trial order was 
pseudorandomized so the same kind of CS (HR/LR) or the same coloured square could not 
appear more than 4 times in a row. 
In total 5 blocks of 72 trials were presented. At the end of each block the total amount earnt 
appeared on screen and participants had to grab the equivalent amount in coins and transfer 
it from a Bank box to their earnings box. 
2.2.5 Emotional Attentional Blink:
After the Conditioning task, participants took the Emotional Attentional Blink. The purpose of 
this task was to evaluate the ability of CS to overcome the influence of aversive distractors.
Each trial consisted of a RSVP of 17 stimuli. Fillers composed of jittered matrices of Houses 
and Buildings appeared at the beginning of the trial. Aversive or neutral distractors appeared 
on the 4th, 6th or 8th position of the series, followed by another filler and the presentation of the 
target, a HR or LR CS. Such a short lag between distractor and target was used as a means 
to increase the interference of distractors [48]. Finally, more fillers were presented to complete 
the stream of 17 images. 
Participants were notified they would not be able to obtain money any longer and instructed 
to detect the presence in the stream of a House or a Building. At the end of each trial they had 
to press one of two keys depending on the category of the target detected. 
The task started with a practice block of 12 trials in which each stimulus appeared on screen 
for 100 ms and feedback about accuracy was presented after each response. 
The main task consisted of 3 blocks of 48 trials. Presentation time of each stimulus was 83 
ms for participants with accuracy on detection above 75% on the practice block, and 100 ms 
for those less accurate (Fig. 2).
The amount of trials displaying aversive or neutral distractors was equally distributed among 
target type and no feedback was displayed during the task. 
72.2.6 Pleasantness measurement:
At the end of the experiment CS pleasantness was measured via Likert scale.  Eighteen House 
pictures and 18 Building pictures from the stimuli presented during conditioning appeared in 
random sequence on screen and participants had to indicate from 1-9 how pleasant each of 
them was. Each of the pictures remained on screen until response. 
2.2.7 Data analysis
2.2.7.1 Expectancy evaluation:
First, participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of the contingencies associated with 
CS depending on their responses to EA assessment.  One sample t-test comparisons were 
performed both for the 4th and 5th block of trials (9 ratings per stimulus per block). Participants 
were deemed to be Aware if their expectancy ratings were significantly above 5 for the HR 
and below 5 for the LR stimuli on one of these blocks of trials; 5 was the rating denoting “I 
don’t know”. On the basis of this approach only 4 participants were classified as aware. 
Therefore data only from the Unaware participants are presented. Data on pleasantness for 
Aware participants are presented in Appendix A.
2.2.7.2 Emotional Attentional Blink (EAB):
Accuracy on detection of targets was the dependent variable for the EAB analysis; a 2-way 
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with CS target (HR vs LR) and distractor type 
(aversive vs. neutral) as within subject factors for Unaware participants. Planned post-hoc t-
tests will examine the hypothesized detrimental effect of aversive distractors on detection of 
LR and HR targets. Differences between HR and LR targets under baseline condition (neutral 
distractors) were also explored using paired t-test. Descriptives for Aware participants are 
included in Appendix A.
2.2.7.3 Pleasantness:
Paired samples t-tests compared pleasantness ratings towards HR and LR stimuli for 
Unaware participants. Descriptives for Aware participants are included in Appendix A. 
2.2.7.4 Supplementary analyses:
RT towards HR and LR stimuli during conditioning were log transformed in order to compare 
them. Paired samples t-tests were performed for Unaware participants, see Appendix A. 
2.3 RESULTS:
2.3.1 Outcome expectancy measurements:
Out of 48 participants, only five met the two awareness criteria (Blocks 4&5, HR=5.19, SD=.78; 
LR=4.4, SD=1.24) and were classified as Aware. The rest, 43 participants, were considered 
Unaware of the contingencies associated with CS (Blocks 4&5, HR=5.42, SD=1.72; LR=5.4, 
SD=1.72).
2.3.2 Emotional Attentional Blink:
There was a significant interaction between target and distractor type for Unaware 
participants, F(1,43)=6762, p=.013. Detection of LR stimuli was significantly lower when 
distractors were aversive compared with neutral, t(43)=2.796, p=.008; this was not the case 
for HR stimuli. Only a marginal effect was found with higher detection for HR when distractors 
were negative compared to neutral, t(43)=1.821, p=.076. There were no significant differences 
between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, t(43)=1.085 p=.284.
2.3.3 Pleasantness measurement:
8No significant differences between HR and LR stimuli in terms of pleasantness t(43)=.273, 
p=.786, were found for Unaware participants, see Fig. 4.
In order to understand the inability of HR stimuli to generate preferential pleasantness, an 
exploratory analysis examined pleasantness development depending on stimulus category 
(Houses vs. Buildings) for Unaware participants. A paired samples t-test found that Houses 
were evaluated as more pleasant than Buildings when they were HR stimuli, t(20)=2.687, 
p=.014, but also when they were associated with LR, t(22)=2.915, p=.008, see Fig. 5. This 
might be due to an effect of the intrinsic value of CS, which may be higher for stimuli more 
related to comfort (Houses), than work and business (Buildings). No differences in 
pleasantness ratings were found between the two types of stimuli outside the conditioning 
procedure (see 2.2.2 Apparatus and Stimuli).
2.3.4 Questionnaires:
There were no significant differences between the Contingency Aware and Unaware groups 
and questionnaire scores (see Table A.1 in Appendix A). 
2.3.5 Supplementary analyses:
No significant differences were found, see Appendix A. 
2.4 DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 1: 
The present task irrelevant conditioning procedure induced expectancy awareness in only 4 
out of 48 participants using probabilities of reward of 80% for HR and 20% for LR stimuli. As 
predicted, when measuring attentional preference towards HR CS compared to LR CS, HR 
stimuli were more resistant to the interference of aversive distractors than LR stimuli 
regardless of expectancy awareness. These results replicate those obtained by Yokoyama et 
al. [28], who did not, however, measure CA. These findings accurately show that CS acquire 
implicit incentive salience, which attracts attention, thus providing evidence towards the ability 
of implicit processes to govern the development of conditioned responses.
Concerning pleasantness, neither Aware nor Unaware participants developed preferential 
subjective pleasantness towards HR stimuli. One reason that Unaware participants failed to 
develop heightened pleasantness towards HR stimuli compared to LR might be the nature of 
the stimuli used during the conditioning task. Despite independent measures of pleasantness 
revealing no differences between Houses and Buildings, after the conditioning task Houses 
were evaluated as more pleasant than Buildings overall. It is possible that the intrinsic 
preference for Houses as a safe and comfortable space opposed to Buildings as workspace, 
in conjunction with the monetary conditioning procedure, overrode the development of 
contingency congruent hedonic responses in Unaware participants. 
Importantly the classification of Aware and Unaware participants did not take into account 
metacognitive awareness measures and the criteria used to separate Aware from Unaware 
participants may have been therefore not rigorous.  
In order to tackle these issues, Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1 using 
abstract geometric shapes devoid of any intrinsic positive meaning and confidence ratings of 
awareness were introduced to classify participants more rigorously as Aware and Unaware.
3. EXPERIMENT 2: 
3.1 AIMS
9The second Experiment addressed some of the limitations of Experiment 1, aiming at 
strengthening evidence towards the existence of implicit emotional and attentional conditioned 
responses.
By implementing abstract stimuli instead of Houses and Buildings, we tried to come up with a 
Conditioning procedure able to generate Pleasantness towards HR CS together with 
preferential attentional salience on participants Unaware of the contingencies. 
In addition, we aimed to improve our classification of participants to different degrees of 
awareness by incorporating confidence ratings on each EA measurement. With this addition 
we hoped participants could be classified in different levels of CA, from unawareness to 
Metacognitive Contingency Awareness, fulfilling criteria established in the Implicit learning 
literature [49]; Bayesian factors were introduced to determine the presence of unconscious 
processes [50].
3.2 METHODS
3.2.1 Participants:
Sixty Sussex University Students (52 females, mean age= 20.51, SD= 3.41) took part in the 
experiment. Participation conditions were identical to those of Experiment 1. 
3.2.2 Apparatus and stimuli:
Two types of abstract stimuli were used as CS in this experiment, Squares and Octagons. A 
set of 72 stimuli was developed using InkScape software. Stimuli consisted of Octagons or 
Squares filled with parallel stripes. In order to generate different stimuli belonging to the same 
category (Squares or Octagons), 5 filling patterns were developed, differentiated in terms of 
stripe thickness. Then, each of the patterns was rotated multiple times, avoiding vertical and 
horizontal orientations as well as alignment with the edges of the figure contour [51]. This way, 
36 Squares unique in terms of filling orientation and pattern and 36 matched Octagons were 
obtained. As this conditioning procedure was task-irrelevant, the stimulus category (Squares 
or Octagons) was the only factor predictive of reward.
The EAB fillers consisted of geometrical figures combining the contour of a Square and an 
Octagon, filled with the same patterns as CS. 
During all the procedures, geometrical shapes were presented superimposed on neutral 
landscape pictures to match the visual characteristics of aversive and neutral distractors. For 
that purpose, 15 neutral pictures were selected from the internet to compose the background 
on each presentation. For examples of fillers and conditioning stimuli see Figure 6.  Distractors 
consisted of the aversive and neutral stimuli as used in Experiment 1. The rest of the 
apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
3.2.3 Procedure: 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except for the fact that Pleasantness 
measurements took place after the Conditioning task, and an extra measurement of Post-hoc 
EA was included at the end of the experiment. 
3.2.4 Conditioning task: 
A task irrelevant conditioning was employed as in Experiment 1, with Squares and Octagons 
as HR or LR CS. In order to increase the proportion of Aware participants, the probability of 
obtaining 10p after a HR stimulus was raised to 90% and decreased to 10% for LR. 
EA was measured via a dichotomous question (“Will you get money?” – Yes/No) on 25% of 
the trials. After their response participants had to indicate how confident they were in their 
judgment using a 1-5 Likert scale, (1. “completely guessing”, 2. “more or less guessing”, 3. 
“fairly sure”, 4. “almost certain”, 5. “completely certain”). The two different types of 
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measurement, dichotomous and Likert, were employed to reduce interference between the 
two responses. The rest of the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. 
3.2.5 Pleasantness measurement and Emotional Attentional Blink:
The procedure was equivalent to the one used in Experiment 1, this time using the set of 
stimuli described above. Pleasantness was measured before the EAB.
3.2.6 Post-hoc Expectancy Measurement: 
Expectancy was measured again at the end of the experiment using a 1-9 Likert scale to 
compare dichotomous online expectancy measurements with post-hoc assessments. 
Eighteen CS for each category were presented and participants asked to indicate how likely 
they thought they were to earn money after each of them. With this confirmatory analysis we 
aimed at reducing regression to the mean effects due to post-hoc categorizations [52].
3.2.7 Data analysis:
3.2.7.1 Bayesian analysis:
A Bayesian analysis [53, 54] allows determining the sensitivity of results obtained and 
extracting scientific conclusions from non-significant results. A Bayes factor (B) below 1/3 
provides substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (i.e. there is no difference between two 
means) and a B above 3 shows substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis. Results 
between 1/3 and 3 indicate data are insensitive. These factors will be used throughout these 
analyses as the main source of CA categorization.
3.2.7.2 Contingency Awareness:
Claiming that learning occurs implicitly requires accepting the null hypothesis that participants 
have not been able to perform above chance level on the task. Orthodox statistics based on 
p-values do not permit the validation of such claims [50]. Therefore, a Bayesian approach will 
be used to establish the existence of unconscious states [55].
In this experiment CA categorization was performed using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) 
methods [37, 56]. In order to compute participants’ accuracy taking into account response 
bias, log Type I d’ (d1’) scores for each participant were computed, using the number of 
individual Hits (H, answering Yes on a HR trial), Correct Rejections (CR, answering No on a 
LR trial), False Alarms (FA, answering Yes on a LR trial) and Misses (M, answering No on a 
HR trial) [57]. Only results from blocks 4 and 5 were considered to account for the 
progressive development of learning. 
In order to run a Bayesian analysis at an individual level for each participant, logistic d1’ 
using Odds ratio (OR) (1) and Standard Errors (SE) (2) [58] were computed for each 
participant:
         
 
Type II d’ (d2’) scores [59] allow determining metacognitive knowledge using accuracy and 
confidence responses for each participant. Each of the confidence ratings was converted 
from Likert scales (1-5), to a dichotomous variable (confident/not confident). Responses 
(2)
(1)
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equal to or below 2 (“more or less guessing”), were considered to be “low confidence”, the 
rest of the responses were considered as “confident”. 
From a SDT point of view, for log d2’ scores [37, 54] H, FA, CR and M are computed as 
follows: accurate responses on expectancy discrimination (Type I Hits or Correct rejections) 
accompanied by a confident response are considered as Hits. Incorrect responses (Type I 
False Alarms or Misses) with high confidence as False Alarms. Correct Rejections are 
incorrect responses rated with low confidence, and Misses are accurate responses rated 
with low confidence.  
Logistic d2’ and SE d2’ were obtained using the same method as previously described. 
A Bayes factor was then computed for each participant on their log d2’, modelling H1 with a 
Uniform going from 0 to their own log d1’ as a maximum, given that d2' rarely exceeds d1’ 
[50]. Participants with a B>3 were categorized as metacognitively Aware, those with B<1/3 
as metacognitively Unaware, and the rest had an undetermined metacognitive state.
The mean log d1's of metacognitively Aware participants was then used as the maximum for 
a Uniform to model H1 for testing each individuals d1's to determine their CA, [50]. The 
interpretation of individual Bs was then used to categorize them as contingency Aware, 
Unaware, or undetermined. 
3.2.7.3 Post-hoc contingency measurement: 
Data extracted from Post-hoc contingency measurements was analysed, as in Experiment 1, 
performing independent samples t-tests on HR and LR stimuli compared to 5 (rating indicating 
“I don’t know”). 
3.2.7.4 Emotional Attentional Blink:
For Aware and Unaware participants, a 2-way Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
on accuracy to detect the targets, with CS targets (HR vs LR) and distractor type (aversive vs. 
neutral) as within factors. Sample sizes and variances differed between groups and therefore 
no between group comparisons were performed (Levene’s for HR neutral with distractors, 
F(1,41)=7.013, p=.011, LR with negative distractors, F(1,41)=7.181, p=.011). We 
hypothesized the same results as in Experiment 1, detection of LR targets would be affected 
by aversive distractors compared to neutral, and detection of HR would not be affected by 
distractor type. We also explored differences between HR and LR targets under baseline 
condition (neutral distractors).
3.2.7.5 Pleasantness: 
A paired samples t-test compared pleasantness towards HR and LR stimuli for Unaware and 
Aware participants separately. No between group comparisons were performed as sample 
sizes and variances were different between groups, Box M F(3,21531)=7.071, p<.001. 
3.2.7.6 Supplementary analyses:
RT towards HR and LR stimuli during conditioning were log transformed in order to compare 
them. Paired samples t-tests were performed for Unaware and Aware participants. 
Accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli was compared within Aware and Unaware participants 
as well as Type 2 d’ scores. Results are reported on Appendix B. 
3.3 RESULTS:
3.3.1 Contingency Awareness:
Using the Bayesian approach for metacognitive CA using log d2’ scores, 27 participants were 
deemed sensitively meta-unaware, 30 didn’t show any sensitive results (3<B>1/3), and 3 
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participants were categorized as metacognitively Aware. Using the mean log d1’ score of 
metacognitively participants as prior (2.72) to establish CA, 28 participants had a sensitive null 
on log d1’ and were effectively contingency Unaware, 6 of them being metacognitively 
insensitive. Fifteen participants were deemed as contingency Aware, 3 of them belonging to 
the metacognitive Aware group, 1 of them to the metacognitively Unaware group, and 11 
having insensitive log d2’ scores. 
Another 17 participants had an insensitive log d1’, their CA could not be established and will 
be excluded from further analyses, see Table 1. For further analysis, results will be reported 
for contingency Aware and Unaware participants, avoiding differentiating them in terms of 
metacognitive knowledge due to the small sample size of meta-aware participants and the 
high number of insensitive ones. 
Type I: Contingency Awareness
Unaware Insensitive Aware  
Unaware 22 4 1 27
Insensitive 6 13 (1) 11 (9) 30
Aware 0 0 3 (2) 3
Type II:
 Metacognitive 
Knowledge
28 17 15 60
Table 1: Contingency table presenting the categorization of participants according to the 
results on their individual Bayes Factors for Type I outcome-Contingency Awareness and on 
Type II tests of Metacognitive Contingency Awareness. (x) participants deemed Contingency 
Aware via post-hoc categorization. 
 3.3.2 Post-hoc Contingency Awareness:
Out of 60 participants, 12 were deemed Aware following the procedure on Experiment 1, 
eleven of them being Contingency Aware according to Bayesian analyses and one having 
originally an insensitive B. Four participants did not pass the post-hoc categorization, implying 
that some forgetfulness might have occurred over time, but generally confirming that the two 
measurement methods are congruent (see Table 1). 
3.3.3 Emotional Attentional Blink:
For the Unaware group, there was a main effect of distractor type on accuracy, F(1,27)=8.064, 
p=.008. No significant interaction between target and distractor type, F(1,27)=1.87, p=.183, 
was found. However, due to the hypothesized effects and taking into account the results 
obtained on Experiment 1, we performed planned paired samples t-tests. 
In the Unaware group aversive distractors decreased detection of LR stimuli, t(27)=2.668, 
p=.013 compared to neutral distractors. Distractor type did not have any significant effect on 
detection of HR stimuli, t(27)=.-052, p>.9, see Fig. 8. There were no significant differences 
between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, t(27)=-.729  p=.472.
These results show again that stimuli conditioned with HR are less affected by the interference 
of aversive distractors than LR stimuli for Contingency Unaware participants. 
For Contingency Aware participants, there was again a main effect of distractor type, 
F(1,14)=11.760, p=.004 but no significant interaction between stimulus and distractors, 
F(1,14)=2.484, p=.137. Here aversive distractors decreased detection of HR compared to 
neutral distractors, t(14)=4.185, p=.001. There was no significant effect of distractor on LR 
target detection, t(14)=-.574, p=.575, see Fig. 8. There was finally a marginally significant 
difference between HR and LR targets under neutral distractors, t(14)=1.966, p=.069.
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3.3.4 Pleasantness:
Results show that HR stimuli (mean=.55, SD=.17) were more pleasant than LR (mean=.49, 
SD=.17), t(42)=2.276, p=.028 collapsing both groups. Analysing separately Aware and 
Unaware participants, a marginal increase in pleasantness towards HR stimuli compared to 
LR for Aware participants, t(14)=1.830, p=.089 was found. The difference was even weaker 
for Unaware participants, t(27)=1.545, p=.134, Fig. 7.  
3.3.5 Questionnaires:
There were no corrected significant differences between Unaware and CA groups in the 
questionnaire scores (see Table B.1 in Appendix B).
3.3.6 Supplementary analyses:
No significant differences were found, see Appendix B. 
3.4 DISCUSSION EXPERIMENT 2: 
Measures of metacognitive awareness incorporated in this experiment gave rise to 3 distinct 
groups. As expected, participants were categorized as Unaware of the contingencies, as 
partially Aware, being able to predict the outcomes associated with CSs; and metacognitively 
Aware, having developed metacognitive knowledge about contingencies. Bayes factors were 
used to perform this classification, a vital step when determining the existence of unconscious 
processes. One of the limitations of this analysis is the fact that many participants showed 
insensitive results, and couldn’t therefore be correspondingly classified. 
Importantly, we replicated the results obtained on the EAB in Experiment 1. We failed at 
obtaining heightened emotional responses towards HR stimuli for Unaware and Aware 
participants separately. However, when considering all participants, HR stimuli were more 
pleasant than LR. This finding shows that abstract stimuli can acquire emotional salience with 
conditioning, and partly helped in overcoming the limitations of Experiment 1 in relation to the 
intrinsic nature of stimuli used.
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION: 
Both experiments showed that expectancy awareness is not necessary to generate 
preferential attention towards CSs. During an EAB task, detection of stimuli associated with 
LR but not HR probabilities decreased in the presence of aversive emotional stimuli as 
distractors. That occurred both in Experiment 1 (all participants were unaware) and in 
Experiment 2 only in participants who were Unaware, and not in those who were Aware of the 
contingencies. Importantly in Experiment 2 awareness criteria were more rigorous. The ability 
of HR stimuli to overcome the interference of aversive distractors as opposed to LR stimuli is 
a proof that attention was preferentially allocated towards HR stimuli. These findings taken 
together provide a first strong account of a implicitly conditioned attentional response using 
an EAB task [28].
In experiment 2 the number of participants with awareness of stimulus-outcome contingencies 
increased allowing us to examine how attention developed in Aware participants.  During the 
EAB, Aware participants seemed to allocate more attention to LR stimuli, as attention to LR 
targets was not affected by aversive distractors; however attention to HR stimuli was affected 
by aversive distractors, implying a decrease in attention allocation to HR stimuli for those 
participants. This might be explained by differences in the predictive power explicitly obtained 
by CS. 
According to the Pearce-Hall theory of attention [60], it is possible that the increased 
predictability of HR stimuli in Aware participants leads to a decreased necessity to focus 
attention on HR stimuli [61], in order to perform accurately, leading to a higher effect of 
interference by the salient negative distractors (but also to a marginal higher accuracy in the 
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presence of neutral distractors (compared to LR)). On the other hand, for Unaware 
participants, for which knowledge about stimuli paired with reward is obviously not sufficient 
to generate correct predictions, the valence obtained by CS through non explicit associations 
drives their attention preferentially towards HR CS, in accordance with Mackintosh’s theory 
[62] of associative learning. Such an explanation could be supported by the fact that Aware 
and Unaware participants combined showed pleasantness towards HR over LR stimuli (main 
effect of stimulus, p=0.028), a measurement of the emotional value of HR stimuli. However 
when the two groups were separately analyzed, both demonstrated a marginal effect, although 
stronger for Aware participants. Of course this explanation should be taken into consideration 
with caution as our data did not demonstrate any difference of contingency awareness 
between HR and LR stimuli; and our data on pleasantness were not as clear for Unaware 
participants. More research on how metacognition about stimuli-reward associations and 
emotional and attentional responses to stimuli associated with reward develops may help to 
integrate both theories [63] and support an understanding on attentional and emotional 
conditioned responses.
During our first experiment, HR CSs were not evaluated as more pleasant than LR stimuli, 
inconsistent with previous research [21]. However, a series of factors could have affected the 
pleasantness ratings. Firstly, stimuli depicting Houses and Buildings were used in Experiment 
1. Even though independent measures carried out in a pilot study had discarded a preferential 
hedonic appraisal of any of the two categories, after conditioning, Houses were evaluated as 
more pleasant than Buildings, even when the latter stimulus type was associated with higher 
probabilities of obtaining money. In previous studies when houses and buildings were used 
as CSs [28], pleasantness ratings were not taken at the end of the conditioning task. During 
the second experiment, abstract geometric stimuli were used as CSs. Those stimuli were 
specifically crafted to prevent them from generating any intrinsic emotional reactions [64–66]. 
This time, stimuli associated with HR were consistently more pleasant than those associated 
with LR if considering the whole sample. These differences highlight one of the limitations of 
stimuli used in experiments evaluating preference towards drug cues, as the graphic nature 
of those stimuli can hinder their ability to generate automatic implicitly learned reactions. 
These findings also point out the importance of using neutral stimuli in conditioning paradigms 
(i.e. stimuli with no possible previous value). 
Another reason why Experiment 1 may have failed at generating preferential hedonic 
reactions towards HR stimuli is the fact that pleasantness was measured after the EAB task. 
This means that CSs had been extensively presented under extinction, as during EAB trials 
there was no reward following CS presentation. It is possible that the effects of conditioning in 
Unaware participants were not strong enough to withstand that kind of extinction procedure, 
explaining why the intrinsic value of the images took over during the pleasantness evaluation 
task. On Experiment 2, pleasantness was measured between the conditioning and EAB tasks, 
and thus that may contribute to the task generating the expected results. 
Importantly, in Experiment 2 higher pleasantness for HR over LR was found, but not for 
Unaware participants in isolation,  failing to support previous findings [21].This is in line with 
previous data showing that CA was necessary for the generation of emotional responses [7], 
but still cannot rule out the ability of Implicitly conditioning to generate hedonic responses, as 
a very marginal effect was seen also in unaware participants and as mentioned above a main 
stimulus effect was highly significant.
Regarding, the EAB for Unaware participants, we find in both experiments that LR stimuli are 
less detectable in the presence of aversive distractors than neutral, whereas HR stimuli were 
not. However these effects were more pronounced in Experiment 1. It is possible that these 
effects were weaker in Experiment 2 due to an effect size (n=43 in experiment 1 and n= 28 in 
experiment 2) or due the fact that EAB was measured later on in the procedure (after the 
measurements of pleasantness) pointing again towards a possible effect of extinction. 
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A recent experiment by Le Pelley et al. [67] showed using a RSVP task that distractors 
associated with reward only affect target detection under conditions of CA, results that 
somehow clash with our findings. However, in their task, the conditioning procedure was 
embedded within the RSVP instead of occurring previously and separately. Moreover, CS in 
their case acted as distractors and not as targets. Their findings suggest that CA is necessary 
for conditioned stimuli during a learning task to affect target detection, whereas our findings 
suggest that CS paired with high reward probabilities can resist the interference of aversive 
distractors after a conditioning task. 
Our procedure used money as reward, which may be considered not as high in value as 
primary reinforcers (e.g. food, drugs etc). However,  as Hogarth at al. [35] already posited, 
conditioning procedures using tobacco or other substance administration as reward can lead 
to reduced reward value by the occurrence of satiety effects. Satiety decreases pleasantness 
attributed towards the substance itself [68]. It is possible that this decrease in pleasantness 
blocks the development of positive attentional responses towards CSs under conditions of 
Contingency Unawareness. Conditioning paradigms targeting the generation of implicit 
conditioned responses should therefore use rewards as outcomes for which satiation is 
difficult to achieve (i.e. money) instead of drug substances or food.
An important aspect of Experiment 2 is that a parsimonious analysis of CA using a statistical 
approach originating in Implicit learning theories [40] and recurring to Bayes factors [55] 
allowed us to classify participants in three different groups: those Unaware of the 
contingencies governing the conditioning task; those able to predict the outcomes associated 
with each CS; and those able to explicitly describe those contingencies. Most importantly, the 
rigorous classification obtained using Bayes factors allows determining the true nature of 
conscious or unconscious processes [50]. Post-hoc expectancy measurements using Likert 
scales were also compared to online measurements of awareness using d1’ score 
categorizations. Interestingly, a high congruency between both kinds of methodologies was 
found. Arguments against the existence of Implicit conditioning are based often on the types  
of EA measurements used to classify awareness [19]. Our results show that a sensible 
approach towards EA measurements suffices in order to obtain reliable implicit measures. 
This fact suggests that the problem underlying inconsistent results in the implicit learning 
literature  [16, 19, 35]  lays more within the kind of conditioning procedure or the type of stimuli 
used, or the measurement of learning by-products (i.e. conditioned emotional responses), 
rather than EA measurements. 
We think that the separation of participants in three groups depending on their CA and 
metacognition is a useful tool to help us understand learning processes, and hence this 
rigorous methodology should be prioritised. In our conditioning the number of Aware 
participants was relatively small to obtain a better differentiation between these subgroups. It 
is possible that the small number of Aware participants is due to the use of a task-irrelevant 
conditioning task that may have impeded explicit learning. 
A high proportion of participants could not definitely be classified as Aware or Unaware of 
contingencies on Experiment 2. Their metacognitive state was also undetermined due to their 
Bayes factors for both measurements being insensitive. As learning is a progressive 
phenomenon, initial trials are uninformative of contingency knowledge compared to later 
blocks. In this experiment EA was measured every 4 trials so as to prevent excessive priming 
of awareness development [19]. Those two factors combined lead to a small amount of trials 
being used for awareness categorization, and therefore generated a higher rate of insensitive 
results. 
In summary, this paper shows convincing evidence of the occurrence of Implicit Pavlovian 
conditioning whilst presenting a novel approach of CA measurement based on Bayes factors. 
It suggests that appetitive CSs can elicit increased attention in conditions of contingency 
unawareness. The attentional correlates of implicit learning  appears to match those 
generated by explicitly learned appetitive CSs as reported in the literature. Our data also 
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indicated a development of implicit emotional response albeit not as clearly. These findings 
therefore highlight a possible role of implicit learning in the development of addictive 
behaviours and support dual process theories of addiction. More research needs to address 
the development of emotional responses in implicit conditioning, as results have proven to be 
inconclusive. 
The utility of the emotional and attentional responses to stimuli associated with reward for 
seeking that reward (i.e. the behavioural response) in the absence of awareness remains to 
be shown. 
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Appendix A:
Table A.1       
Data for demographic and questionnaire information for Experiment 1 depending on 
Awareness group and statistics for ANOVA comparing Contingency Aware and 
Unaware groups. 
             Unaware n= 44            Aware n=4
 Mean SD Mean SD F p
Age 23.43 7.32 28.00 13.59 1.23 0.27
Panas positive 2.90 0.79 2.65 1.49 0.32 0.58
Panas negative 1.52 0.48 1.30 0.42 0.76 0.39
BIS 2.82 0.32 3.00 0.42 1.09 0.30
BAS 2.96 0.41 2.90 0.53 0.07 0.80
BAS Drive 2.74 0.64 2.75 0.74 0.00 0.99
BAS Reward 3.35 0.44 3.65 0.25 1.80 0.19
BAS Fun seeking 2.79 0.68 2.31 0.75 1.78 0.19
Barrat Total 2.15 0.41 1.71 0.26 4.34 0.04
Barrat Attentional 2.24 0.48 1.81 0.33 2.99 0.09
Barrat Motor 2.04 0.44 1.66 0.33 2.83 0.10
Barrat Nonplanning 2.16 0.52 1.66 0.30 3.54 0.07
Alcohol Use Total 29.92 24.67 8.45 10.46 2.93 0.09
Binge score 20.20 17.36 3.38 4.03 3.67 0.06
Alcohol units/week 9.71 9.94 5.08 6.47 0.83 0.37
AUDIT 7.98 6.16 2.75 3.40 2.76 0.10
Experiment 1
Pleasantness for Aware participants:
For the four Aware participants, pleasantness towards HR (mean=6.97, SD=.89) and LR 
(mean= 5.74, SD=1.43) stimuli was computed. 
Emotional Attentional Blink for Aware participants:
For the four Aware participants, accuracy on the EAB was computed. Under neutral distractors, 
HR stimuli had an accuracy of .67 (SD=.08) and under aversive distractors of .73 (SD=.09). 
Under neutral distractors, LR stimuli had an accuracy of .55 (SD=.20) and under aversive 
distractors of .39 (SD=.20). 
RT during the conditioning task:
Results show no significant differences in RT towards HR and LR stimuli for Unaware 
participants, there was only a marginal difference, with increased RT towards HR stimuli 
(mean=2.67, SD=.08) than LR (mean=2.66, SD=.08), t(43)=1.705, p=.095. For Aware 
participants, RT towards HR stimuli were 2.74 (SD=.16) and LR stimuli were 2.74 (SD=.16).
Appendix B: 
Experiment 2
Table B.1
Data for demographic and questionnaire information for Experiment 2 depending on 
Awareness group and statistics for ANOVA comparing Contingency Aware and Unaware 
groups.
 Unaware n= 28 Aware n=15
 Mean SD Mean SD F p
Age 20.50 4.10 20.60 1.99 .008 .930
Panas positive 2.76 0.75 3.01 0.65 1.248 .270
Panas negative 1.44 0.41 1.57 0.52 .770 .385
BIS 1.60 0.35 1.89 0.44 5.837 .020
BAS 2.03 0.28 2.05 0.22 .056 .814
BAS Drive 2.35 0.42 2.32 0.55 .044 .834
BAS Reward 1.64 0.33 1.60 0.33 .114 .737
BAS Fun seeking 2.21 0.50 2.35 0.47 .861 .359
Barrat Total 2.02 0.23 2.11 0.27 1.401 .243
Barrat Attentional 2.12 0.43 2.09 0.44 .071 .791
Barrat Motor 1.90 0.30 2.00 0.42 .780 .382
Barrat Nonplanning 2.06 0.27 2.15 0.42 .773 .385
Alcohol Use Total 28.40 19.64 32.57 27.28 .335 .566
Binge score 15.38 11.20 18.73 15.62 .663 .420
Alcohol units/week 13.02 13.63 13.84 13.39 .036 .851
AUDIT 6.36 4.35 7.93 5.39 1.085 .304
RT during the conditioning task:
Results show no significant differences in RT towards HR (mean=2.66, SD=.10) and LR 
(mean=2.66, SD=.10) stimuli for Unaware participants, t(27)=.480, p=.635. For Aware 
participants, there was no significant difference between HR (mean=2.70, SD=.09) and LR 
(mean=2.69, SD=.09) stimuli, t(14)=.560, p=.584.
Accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli: 
There were no significant differences in accuracy towards HR and LR stimuli neither for 
Unaware, t(27)=.055, p=.956 (HR=.46, SD=.20; LR=.46, SD=.19), nor for Aware participants, 
t(14)=.760, p=.460 (HR=.89, SD=.15; LR=.85, SD=.18).
Metacognition towards HR and LR stimuli: 
There were no significant differences in d2’ scores towards HR and LR stimuli neither for 
Unaware, t(27)=1.415, p=.169 (HR=-.19, SD=.54; LR=.12, SD=.76), nor for Aware participants, 
t(14)=.704, p=.493 (HR=.1.08, SD=.77; LR=.89, SD=.87).
List of Figures
Figure 1: Conditioning task. 
Each trial consisted of the presentation of a House or a Building with an overlaid coloured 
square. For half of the participants, Buildings were associated with High reward (80% 
probability of wining 10p) and Houses with Low reward (20% probability). For the other half 
of the sample, probabilities were inverted across stimuli categories. Participants had to press 
a key depending on the colour of the square (Green/Yellow) in the middle of the picture. 
Stimuli appeared on screen for 2000 ms or until a response was given. After their response 
participants were informed whether they had won 10p or not on that trial. On 25% of the 
trials, right after their response, participants were asked to indicate from 1 = “not at all” to 9 
“extremely” how likely they were to win 10p (measurement of Expectancy Awareness). 
Immediately after Expectancy Awareness measurement, feedback about earnings on that 
trial appeared on screen. 
Figure 2: Emotional Attentional Blink. 
Seventeen stimuli were presented in each trial on a RSVP stream for 83-100 ms each. The 
stimuli presented were a series of Fillers composed by jittered pictures of Houses and 
Buildings and an Aversive or Neutral distractor appeared on position 4, 6 or 8 of the series. 
After the distractor, a Filler was presented followed by a target consisting of a House or a 
Building. Finally, more fillers appeared to complete the 17 stimuli sequence. Participants’ 
task was to indicate the detection of a House or a Building by pressing one of two keys at 
the end of the trial. 
Figure 3: Accuracy of target detection (High reward or Low Reward) depending on 
Distractor type (Aversive or neutral), Experiment 1. 
Accuracy on target detection depending on reward associated and distractor type for 
Unaware participants. * Low reward targets under aversive distractors compared to neutral 
distractors, p<0.01.
Figure 4: Pleasantness ratings depending on stimulus type for contingency Unaware 
participants, Experiment 1.
Pleasantness ratings towards High reward and Low reward stimuli for Unaware participants; 
there were no significant differences in either of the groups, ps>0.7.
 
Figure 5: Pleasantness ratings per stimulus category for Unaware participants, 
Experiment 1. 
Pleasantness towards High Reward and Low reward CS depending on the stimulus (houses 
or buildings) associated with High reward. (*) Low reward compared to High reward when 
Buildings were High reward, p<.02; * High reward compared to Low reward when Houses 
were High reward, p<.01. Houses were overall more pleasant than Buildings (main effect of 
stimulus type).
Figure 6: Stimuli used on Experiment 2.
Stimuli (octagons and squares) chosen for Experiment 2 to replace Houses and Buildings 
used in Experiment 1. 36 Octagons (A) and 36 Squares (B) were used as Conditioned 
Stimuli. Those stimuli appeared on the Conditioning task and on the Emotional Attentional 
Blink. A set of 15 fillers combining the outline of Squares and Octagons was also developed 
(C1/ C2). All stimuli appeared overlaid on a picture showing a neutral landscape. This was 
set in order to match the visual characteristics of stimuli series during Emotional Attentional 
Blink between the two experiments. Aversive and Neutral distractors used during Emotional 
Attentional Blink in Experiment 2 were the same as the ones used in Experiment 1.
Figure 7: Pleasantness ratings depending on stimulus type and contingency 
awareness, Experiment 2. 
There were no significant differences between High reward and Low reward stimuli in either 
Aware or Unaware participants, ps>.08. However a significant stimulus effect (p=0.28) was 
Found when the 2 groups were collapsed.
Figure 8: Emotional Attentional Blink results for Unaware (A) and Aware (B) 
participants, Experiment 2. 
Accuracy on target detection depending on reward associated and distractor type for 
Unaware participants. A: * Low reward targets under aversive distractors compared to 
neutral distractors, p<0.025. B: * High reward targets under aversive distractors compared to 
neutral distractors, p<.001. There was a marginally significant difference between HR and 
LR targets under neutral distractors, p=.069
